Showing posts with label Liverpool. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Liverpool. Show all posts

Monday, May 23, 2011

Liverpool's Future Strategy


If ever a football club’s season could be described as the proverbial “game of two halves” that would be the one experienced by Liverpool fans this year. Following Roy Hodgson’s appointment as manager last July as the replacement for the popular Rafael Benitez, the Reds endured their worst league start in more than 50 years, falling into the relegation zone in October after a dismal home defeat to newly promoted Blackpool.

Hodgson’s grim tenure came to an end in January, when he was replaced by Kenny Dalglish, who inspired a revival that took Liverpool back up the table to sixth place. Moreover, the team threw off the shackles and played some sparkling football, including wins over Manchester United, Chelsea and Manchester City. Although Dalglish’s record in his previous reign on the Mersey was highly impressive, winning three league titles and two FA Cups, some had expressed doubts about the Scot’s credentials, as he had not managed a club for more than a decade and he was initially appointed on a temporary basis.

However, the mood at Anfield has clearly taken a massive turn for the better and virtually all of the non-believers have now been converted. Thus, it was no surprise that Dalglish was duly confirmed as permanent manager a couple of weeks ago, when he was given a three-year contract along with his first team coach Steve Clarke. As new owner John W Henry said, “Kenny is a legendary figure, both as a supremely gifted footballer and successful manager.”

"John W Henry - the man with a plan"

The new ownership is, of course, the other vital change to occur at Liverpool during this momentous season with New England Sports Ventures (NESV) taking over from the reviled pair of Tom Hicks and George Gillett last October. Well known for its stewardship of the Boston Red Sox, one of the most famous baseball teams, and involvement in NASCAR, the company has now changed its name to the Fenway Sports Group (FSG), but the key executives remain the same. As far as Liverpool are concerned that means John W Henry, the principal owner, and Tom Werner, the chairman, who both hold 50% of the voting rights in the football club.

They look like a good fit for Liverpool, as explained by the club’s former chairman Martin Broughton, “New England have a lot of experience in developing, investing in and taking Boston Red Sox - as the closest parallel - from being a club with a wonderful history, a wonderful tradition that had lost the winning way, and bringing it back to being a winner.” In fact, after buying the Red Sox in 2002, NESV delivered success just two years later, as they won the World Series in 2004, ending an 86-year wait for honours, and then repeating the feat in 2007.

On the face of it, they could not be more different to their unpopular predecessors, Hicks and Gillett, who saddled Liverpool with a mountain of debt when they bought the club in March 2007. Ever since then, the Reds had been on a financial knife edge. Even though the eternally optimistic former managing director Christian Purslow claimed that he could not “conceive of a situation where Liverpool Football Club could go into administration”, the reality was that the choice had been taken out of his hands.

"Luis Suarez - happy days"

The club’s bank loans were due for repayment in January 2010, but the club failed to make the £250 million payment, and the club only survived when the bank extended the date first to March and then by a further seven months to October to facilitate the sale of the club. Liverpool’s auditors KPMG had gone public with their concern over the level of debt the previous year, when they described the issue as “a material uncertainty which may cast significant doubt on the group’s and parent company’s ability to continue as a going concern.”

UEFA were also well aware of Liverpool’s financial difficulties. Last month William Gaillard, Senior Advisor to UEFA President Michel Platini, spoke about them, while warning football dignitaries of the dangers of leveraged buy-outs, “The club has been rescued, thank God, but it was a close call. They suddenly found themselves being owned by two failed banks that had been taken over by governments.”

In fact, the Royal Bank of Scotland (or indeed Wachovia) could have put the club into administration (with a nine point penalty) at any time in the last few months of the Hicks and Gillett regime. Importantly, this meant that RBS could dictate terms, allowing them to place Purslow and commercial director Ian Ayre on a reconstituted board, while stipulating that the owners could no longer appoint new representatives to the board. This meant that when the decision to sell the club was taken, Hicks and Gillett no longer had a majority, so could be outvoted by the other board members.

"Keep calm and Carra on"

Even though he is from Texas, Tom Hicks did not know when to “fold them” and tried to block the sale, describing the transaction as “an epic swindle at the hands of rogue corporate directors.” So RBS brought a legal action before the High Court to obtain a judgment on the ability of the new board to complete the sale to NESV, which they duly won. Even the elegant Broughton could not resist putting the boot in, describing the former owners’ actions as “a flagrant abuse of their undertakings.”

Acting on behalf of the club, Barclays Capital had contacted 130 potential investors, but only two bids had been received before the deadline with NESV’s winning out. They paid a total of £300 million for the club: £218 million for the equity, effectively the amount that Hicks and Gillett owed to RBS, and £83 million to assume responsibility for other debts. This was a pretty good outcome for the club, as the acquisition debt was wiped out, leaving NESV with more funds to spend on the football side of the club – and it had the added bonus of serving up a side order of schadenfreude, as Hicks and Gillett lost their £144 million investment.

The last accounts published under the old administration reflected the club’s financial shortcomings, as they reported a £20 million loss, which was £6 million worse than the previous year, even though profit on player sales rose dramatically from £4 million to £23 million, mainly due to the sale of Xabi Alonso to Real Madrid. The wage bill climbed an incredible 18% to £113 million, which was much higher than the 4% revenue growth.

That said, for the last two years, Liverpool have only made a small loss before interest payments, £2.3 million in 2010 and £3.5 million in 2009, but the impact of interest on the loans that Hicks and Gillett took out to buy the club has been hugely detrimental with net interest payable increasing from £13 million last year to £18 million in 2010.

However, that’s not the whole story, as these are only the accounts for The Liverpool Football Club and Athletic Grounds Limited, while the majority of the club’s debt was held in the holding company. Unfortunately, the 2010 accounts for Kop Football (Holdings) Limited, the largest group company incorporated in the UK, have not yet been published, but we do know that the net interest payable at that level in 2009 was a whopping £40 million, leading to a net loss for the group of £55 million. If we make the reasonable assumption that the level of interest in 2010 is the same, this would mean that the club had paid around £125 million of interest during Hicks and Gillett’s unhappy reign.

Another interesting point is the large amounts paid out for changes in management, which amounts to £12 million in the last two years, including around £8 million for Rafael Benitez and his coaching staff in 2010 and £3 million compensation for directors’ loss of office in 2009 (reportedly Rick Parry).

In fact, Liverpool have only made a profit once in the last five years, specifically 2008, when they registered an £8 million surplus, largely due to £22 million profit on player sales, after a number of experienced players were moved on (Crouch, Sissoko, Carson, Riise and Guthrie). However, the new Premier League deal was also an important contributory factor, leading to a £16 million rise in television revenue.

Like all football clubs, the additional riches provided by the ever-increasing TV deals has been a critical factor in Liverpool’s revenue growth, contributing almost half (£29 million) of the £64 million rise in turnover since 2005. However, the fastest growing activity is commercial income, which has risen an impressive 68% in the same period. Match day revenue has also grown from £33 million to £43 million, but remained relatively flat compared to the other revenue streams. On the plus side, Liverpool’s revenue is fairly evenly distributed among the three main revenue streams, which means that they are not unduly reliant on one area.

There are a couple of ways to look at Liverpool’s revenue of £185 million. On the one hand, this puts them in a more than respectable ninth place in the Deloitte’s Money League, which ranks clubs in order of revenue, but, on the other hand, they are still a long way behind the clubs at the top of the (money) tree. In particular, the Spanish giants generate considerably more income with Real Madrid and Barcelona earning £359 million and £326 million respectively, approaching twice as much as the Reds. Moreover, bitter rivals Manchester United earn £100 million more than Liverpool every season, which is a considerable competitive advantage.

Furthermore, Liverpool dropped a place in the Money League last season and can expect a further decline next year, as they will not have the benefit of Champions League revenue, while Manchester City’s commercial revenue is likely to climb again under their Middle East owners. This would mean that four English clubs will receive more money than Liverpool (United, Arsenal, Chelsea and City), which would be a concern, unless the new owners can address the club’s weaknesses.

One obvious issue is the wage bill, which has soared to £114 million, up from £96 million the previous year, mainly due to contract extensions. This has increased the important wages to turnover ratio to 62%, the first time that it has gone above 60% in that period. In fairness, this is still below UEFA’s recommended maximum limit of 70% and is much better than most other clubs in the Premier League, notably big-spending Manchester City (107%) and Chelsea (82%). What is worrying, however, is that performance on the pitch has worsened, while the wage bill has risen, which is the opposite of what usually happens in football, culminating in the team failing to qualify for the lucrative Champions League.

That was then, this is now.

The recently appointed managing director, Ian Ayre, described the results as “a footnote in our history”, as he suggested that the club was now “moving forward.” It is entirely appropriate that we concentrate on the new owners’ future strategy, not least because John W Henry made his fortune as a futures trader.

Actually, I say “fortune”, but everything’s relative. While his estimated worth of £375 million might be enormously impressive to the proverbial man in the street, it’s small change compared to the billions owned by other prominent owners of football clubs, such as Sheikh Mansour, Roman Abramovich, Stan Kroenke and even the Glazers. It’s actually even lower than the likes of Peter Coates at Stoke City and David Sullivan at West Ham.

Therefore, Liverpool fans should not expect a classic sugar daddy. Instead they have got a group of savvy businessmen with proven expertise and a superlative record in sports management. Nevertheless, the new owners will still need to access substantial funds in order to strengthen the squad and address the stadium situation (either build a new stadium or redevelop Anfield), so the obvious question is how will this be financed? Liverpool fans would not want to see the club take on large levels of debt once again, so Henry’s team really has to address the club’s faltering business model.

Although we are not privy to their strategic plan, we can make some fairly good guesses at where they will try to turn around Liverpool’s finances, based on their announcements to date, which I have attempted to summarise in a 15-point plan.

1. Put your shirt on it

While discussing the most recent financial results, Ian Ayre stated, “We have had significant commercial growth since these accounts were published.” He can point to the shirt sponsorship deal with Standard Chartered starting next season, which “can generate up to £81 million” over four years. Although it is understood that some of this may be performance related, this implies £20 million per annum, which is £12.5 million higher than the current deal with Carlsberg. This is in line with Manchester United’s Aon deal, but Barcelona’s £25 million deal with the Qatar Foundation has raised the bar again - even higher than Bayern Munich’s £24 million deal with Deutsche Telekom.

Last month it was reported that Liverpool had secured a £25 million kit deal with Warrior Sports, a subsidiary of New Balance, from the 2012/13 season, though this has not been officially confirmed. This is an example of the synergy that FSG can bring to the party, as Warrior recently announced a deal to manufacture kit for the Red Sox. The deal would more than double the amount received from Adidas, who currently pay £12 million a year. Although the press reported this as a record for English football, it is actually slightly lower than Manchester United’s Nike deal, which had a contractual step-up from £23.3 million to £25.4 million this season, but it’s still a mighty impressive increase.

In total, the two shirt deals will deliver a substantial revenue increase of around £25 million a season (Standard Chartered £12.5 million, Warrior £13 million).

2. Going global

Liverpool’s commercial income of £62 million is already pretty good, being sixth highest in the Money League, though it is only half the amount earned by Bayern Munich and Real Madrid and it actually fell last year if you consider that LiverpoolFC TV Ltd was brought in-house in July 2009. In fact, Liverpool sell more shirts than any other club except Madrid, Barcelona and United.

An important element of the club’s strategy is therefore to “leverage the club’s global following to deliver revenue growth”, which Tom Werner emphasised, “We consider Liverpool to have untapped potential globally.” This is clearly one of the key drivers for American investors, as explained by Don Gerber, head of Major League Soccer, “There’s a belief that there’s a valuable global franchise with these clubs.”

In particular, Werner has stated that the club is focused on Asia (“The support the club has there is already considerable”), hence the pre-season tour to China and South Korea. However, this has lead to club sponsor Standard Chartered, who make much of their income in Asia, somewhat crassly suggesting that they would like Liverpool to sign players from that region, citing the example of Park Ji-Sung at United.

Liverpool fans would have been equally perplexed at the news that basketball star LeBron James had bought a stake in the club, but this is part of his marketing deal with FSG and has helped raise Liverpool’s profile in the States.

More worrying is Ian Ayre’s apparent support for the 39th game, a proposal to play an extra round of Premier League matches at neutral venues outside England: “We have a duty to fans around the world to give them access to the product.” I’m not sure that the fans on the Kop would necessarily agree with that sentiment.

3. Nothing succeeds like success

While it is true that success on the pitch should lead to financial strength, this is not always the case, which is amply demonstrated by the distribution of Premier League revenue. In Liverpool’s case, their share of the revenue only fell £2.3 million in 2009/10 to £48 million, even though they dropped from second to seventh place.

This is because of how the Premier League distribution model works with half of the domestic money and all of the overseas rights being split evenly among the 20 clubs. It’s true that 50% of the domestic rights are still up for grabs, but that does not make a big difference for the leading clubs: (a) 25% is for merit payments with each place in the league worth £800,000; (b) 25% is paid in facility fees, based on how often a club is shown live on television, which will always be a lot for a club like Liverpool.

However, the key point here is that a club’s revenue will effectively go up by default, simply from its presence in the Premier League, as each new TV deal increases the size of the pot available to distribute. The three-year deal for 2004-2007 was worth £1.45 billion, while 2007-10 rose to £2.5 billion and the latest contract for 2010-13 is worth an incredible £3.4 billion. Figures have not yet been released for 2010/11, but the increase for Liverpool will be at least £7 million.

4. We are the champions

The relatively small difference between the leading clubs in terms of Premier League distributions only emphasises the importance to Liverpool of qualifying for the Champions League. Last season the Reds earned £26 million from this competition, even though they were eliminated at the group stage, supplemented by £3 million after parachuting into the Europa League and reaching the semi-finals. That figure does not include extra gate receipts or higher payments from success clauses in commercial deals.

Liverpool’s failure to qualify for Europe’s flagship tournament for the last two seasons has cost them dearly. Given that UEFA’s prize money has been increasing on the back of higher TV deals, all in all, it’s probably now worth at least £35 million a season. It is therefore imperative that Liverpool reclaim their traditional place among Europe’s elite.

5. The revolution will be televised

While TV rights as a whole have been rising, the really interesting aspect is that overseas fans that have been behind the explosive growth with the revenue doubling each time the rights are re-negotiated: 2001-04 £178 million, 2004-07 £325 million, 2007-10 £625 million and 2010-13 £1.4 billion.

As Steve McMahon, the former Liverpool player turned executive at the Singapore-based Profitable Group, said, “It is a global game. The television figures when Liverpool or Manchester United play are 600 or 700 million.” These figures dwarf the Super Bowl, hence the interest of American investors in the Premier League.

This is particularly relevant to Liverpool, as FSG have substantial expertise in this sphere, owning 80% of New England Sports Network, a regional cable television network, while Tom Werner is an experienced television producer. Although English football clubs have clearly benefited from television money, they are strictly amateurs compared to their cousins across the water. To give an idea of the size of the prize, the value of the New York Yankees’ official cable network is three times as high as the club itself.

Perhaps the most intriguing question is how Premier League clubs react to new technology. To date, digital rights have been treated as little more than an afterthought to the main TV deal, but the emergence of fast, broadband networks might just be the catalyst for clubs to interact directly with fans, when revenue could potentially explode.

6. A fair day’s work for a fair day’s pay

On completing due diligence, John W Henry said that Liverpool’s wage bill was one of “a number of unpleasant shocks”. Specifically, he thought that it was a huge payroll for a squad with little depth. It stands to reason that the £114 million wage bill should be reduced, especially when you consider that it is so much higher than Tottenham’s £67 million. That does not imply a “slash and burn” approach, more a case of the club getting better value for money, as Henry explained, “We have to be more efficient. When we spend a dollar, it has to be wisely. We cannot afford player contracts that do not make long-term sense.”

7. Steady as she goes

One obvious way to cut costs would be to stop sacking managers. Including the £7.3 million reportedly paid to Roy Hodgson (after just six months), this adds up to the best part of £20 million in the last three years. Encouragingly, Henry said, “Our goal in Liverpool is to create the kind of stability that the Red Sox enjoy. We are committed to building for the long-term.” That said, Tom Werner did say that he saw “no reason why Roy can’t be our coach this year and in the future” only two months before he was given his P45, though, in fairness, Hodgson was not FSG’s appointment. The new owners will also try to bring continuity by adopting the director of football model, which has not always been successful in England, but has worked very well at clubs like Lyon.

"Cheer up, Fernando. You just made Liverpool £50m"

8. The art of the deal

One possibility that would help reduce the wage bill is offloading players who are no longer wanted. We can anticipate Liverpool selling the likes of Jovanovic, Poulsen and Aurelio at generous prices in order to get them off the books. There are also quite a few players currently out on loan that are likely to leave, including Aquilani, Konchesky and Degen.

Such sales have a triple whammy effect, as they also reduce player amortisation, which is on the high side at Liverpool, and potentially bring in a profit on sale (if the sales price is higher than the remaining value in the accounts). Liverpool will report a very high profit on sale in this year’s accounts, mainly due to the £50 million sale of Fernando Torres to Chelsea, but also Javier Mascherano to Barcelona for £17 million and Ryan Babel to Hoffenheim for £6 million, and next year’s profit could also be on the high side if the new owners clean house.

Babel is a good example of how this works in accounting terms. Purchased from Ajax in 2007 on a five-year contract for £11.5 million, you would assume that his £6 million sale in January would have produced a loss. In total, that would be correct, but in this year’s accounts the club will actually show a £2.6 million profit, as the player’s value in the books had been written-down to £3.4 million (£11.5 million cost less 3.5 years amortisation at £2.3 million a year).

9. Can’t buy me love

Liverpool have effectively been a selling club during the Hicks and Gillett era with the net spend dramatically slowing down after their arrival. Some have speculated that the new owners will be equally cautious, referring to FSG’s belief in the application of statistical analysis made famous by Moneyball, Michael Lewis’ best seller about the innovative methods adopted by Billy Beane at the Oakland Athletics baseball club. However, there is a bit more to their transfer market strategy, as explained by Larry Lucchino, president and CEO of the Red Sox, who said that they “take some of the quantitative analysis approaches and overlay them with the resource advantages of our market.”

In other words, they have used their financial muscle to complement best value purchases by also spending big on the right players. It’s more like the Barcelona method, rather than the Arsenal strategy they have publicly praised. Henry underlined this willingness to splash the cash when necessary by pointing out that the Red Sox had been second in spending over the last decade in major league baseball.

"Andy Carroll - big fee for a big man"

A more obvious example occurred in January when Liverpool paid £35 million for Andy Carroll and £23 million for Luis Suarez. Incidentally, Henry has explained that the seemingly exorbitant Carroll fee still fits in with FSG’s principles, as they were happy to pay this, as long as they secured £15 million more when selling Torres.

With all the likely ins and outs, my guess is that Liverpool fans and director of football Damien Comolli can expect a very busy summer in the transfer market.

10. Give youth a chance

So FSG’s preferred model is one with top quality stars supplemented by home grown youngsters, as outlined by Henry, “We have been successful through spending and through securing and developing young players.” Tom Werner added, “We certainly feel we can do a better job bringing in more players that are home grown”, as he promised to invest in the scouting network.

This makes complete sense in the Financial Fair Play era, as youth development costs are excluded from UEFA’s break-even calculation. In addition, any profit on the sale of players that don’t quite make it at Liverpool is useful in balancing the books.

In fairness, the academy set up by Rafa Benitez is already prospering with many players involved in first team action this season (Jay Spearing, Martin Kelly, John Flanagan and Jack Robinson). Last month, the progress was endorsed by no fewer than seven Liverpool youngsters being named in England’s Under-19 squad, following the selection of four players in the Under-17 squad.

11. Grounds for hope

Although Anfield is a wonderfully atmospheric old ground, its capacity is only 45,400, which is much less than Old Trafford (76,000) and The Emirates (60,400). Liverpool’s match day revenue of £43 million is less than half of Manchester United (£100 million) and Arsenal (£94 million), while even Chelsea, whose Stamford Bridge ground is even smaller (41,800), generate more than them (£67 million). Liverpool only earn around £1.6 million from each home match, which is significantly less than United (£3.6 million) and Arsenal (£3.5 million).

The previous owners felt that the only way to increase match day income was to build a new stadium, but they put the plans for Stanley Park on hold, due to the economic crisis. However, FSG are also looking at the option of redeveloping Anfield. The Red Sox chief operating officer Sam Kennedy summed up the situation, “We have the expertise for building new and renovating old, and both options are definitely still on the table.”

The ownership built new stadiums in Baltimore and San Diego, but perhaps more pertinently redeveloped Fenway Park, the iconic Red Sox stadium, applying creative techniques such as more seats, concessions, advertising and corporate hospitality, which increased match day income by 50%.

Given that the accounts state that nearly £50 million of previously capitalised stadium development costs are “highly likely” to be written-off, the implication is that the preference is for redevelopment at Anfield, not least because Henry admitted that the previous stadium move proposals “just didn’t make any economic sense or they would have been built.”

Whichever route is taken, it will still cost a lot of money, e.g. the Fenway Park renovation cost north of £200 million. As the costs are so high, the possibility of ground sharing with Everton cannot be ruled out, but the counter-argument is that any future revenue would also have to be shared.

"Pepe Reina has his say"

12. You’ll never walk alone

The downside of staying at Anfield is that fans are likely to have to pay more for their tickets. To compensate for the revenue shortfall at the Red Sox, ticket prices have rocketed in Boston. Indeed, season tickets next season have already gone up 6.5%, though 2.5% of that is to cover the VAT increase, with the cheapest tickets on the Kop now costing £725, the most expensive £802. Surprisingly, the entry level tickets are more expensive than any other team in the Premier League except Arsenal, according to a survey by Sporting Intelligence. This is on top of significant price increases last season.

13. What’s in a name?

Ian Ayre has confirmed that Liverpool would actively look for a stadium naming rights partner – but only if they move to a new stadium. Not many English clubs have succeeded in securing naming rights, but it is more common in America and could provide up to £10 million a season, maybe more with FSG’s contacts.

14. Never was so much owed by so many to so few

Liverpool’s debt had reached shocking levels under the previous unwanted regime. Although there was “only” £123 million net debt in the football club, the full picture was revealed in the holding company where debt had grown to over £400 million, including £280 million owed to the banks, which had surged after the bank applied penalty fees for the loan extension, and £144 million owed to Hicks and Gillett.

The really good news is that Henry has confirmed that the change in ownership has removed all the debt except for £37 million for development work on the proposed new stadium, which is part of a £92 million credit facility agreed with RBS. Normal working capital requirements mean that £87 million of this had been used by 31 January this year.

This is enormously significant to the club’s finances, as the prohibitively expensive annual interest payments of £40 million have been drastically reduced to just £3 million, which means that Liverpool are “able to invest more in the team rather than servicing debt” according to Ian Ayre.

Of course, debt could substantially rise again for future stadium developments, but Henry does not appear overly concerned, “I think fans will understand that stadium debt is different from acquisition debt.”

"Steven Gerrard reflects on the first half of the season"

15. All’s fair in love and war

John W Henry has praised UEFA’s forthcoming Financial Fair Play rules that aim to make clubs live within their means, while curbing excessive spending, “UEFA is doing a great thing in making clubs sustainable and that’s good news for us.” In fact, UEFA’s William Gaillard claimed that the main reason why Henry (and indeed Thomas di Benedetto at Roma) had invested in European football was the new regulations, as “they make a much more predictable environment, more similar to what they are used to in American sport.”

Although the new owner is concerned that other clubs might seek to find ways around the rules, especially after Chelsea’s massive spending spree in the January transfer window, this will not be the Liverpool way: “We've always spent money we've generated rather than deficit spending and that will be the case in Liverpool. It's up to us to generate enough revenue to be successful over the long term. We will not deviate from that.”

So, FSG have plenty to offer in their play book, but some have wondered whether their proficiency in American sports will mean much in England. Turning round the Red Sox is one thing, but Liverpool football club is (quite literally) a different ball game. While Liverpool share many similarities with the Red Sox, such as a glorious history, passionate fanbase, small stadium and, er, they both play in red, there are also quite a few differences in the two sports.

"Lucas and Meireles reinvigorated by King Kenny"

In particular, Premier League football clubs do not have a salary cap, have to deal with powerful agents and need to worry about the threat of relegation. That last point may not apply to Liverpool, but at the other end of the table they are concerned with the financial consequences of missing out on the Champions League. It is also fair to say that Boston is a wealthier city than Liverpool, so FSG’s strategy of raising ticket prices may not be appropriate on the Mersey, though you have to think that the new owners are too smart to squeeze the orange too hard.

Of course, an owner’s nationality should not be an issue. As Martin Broughton said, “There’s nothing wrong with being American. Ask Sunderland, Ellis Short is a great owner there. Wherever you come from you need the right people. These are the right people.” There might be a nagging concern that they will not bring the same level of commitment to Liverpool as to their American franchise, but if that were the case, it begs the question of why they would get involved in the first place.

Fundamentally, they are businessmen, who will have been attracted by Liverpool’s “fire sale” price and enormous potential, but Henry has said that investors in sports franchises are not in it for the money, “I don’t think you go into sport to make a profit.” He has asserted that all the money NESV has made in baseball has been ploughed back into the Red Sox, be it the team or the club’s infrastructure. Ultimately, money can be made from football if and when the value of the club appreciates, but that is likely to mean a long-term investment.

"Anfield of Dreams"

Let’s not forget that Liverpool football club is one of football’s great institutions with an incredible history: winning the Champions League and European Cup five times, the English League championship eighteen times and the FA Cup seven times. In business terms, it remains one of the leading sports brands, with the club competing in the most watched domestic league on the planet.

Arguably, John W Henry has got himself a bargain here, though there is much to do to strengthen the club’s business model. As the club’s sponsor said, “I don’t think English Premier League clubs know how valuable they are.” If Henry can help instill the winning mentality back into Liverpool, as his group did with the Red Sox, this could be a licence to print money. Of course, the fans are more interested in whether the team does the business on the pitch. Over to you, Kenny.

Monday, May 17, 2010

Are Liverpool A Good Investment?


So Liverpool FC is up for sale – not just the minority stake that the club’s reviled owners, Tom Hicks and George Gillett, had placed on the market many months ago, but the whole damn thing. Liverpool’s bankers have finally run out of patience with the unpopular duo and brought in a new chairman, Martin Broughton from British Airways, with the explicit task of securing a buyer and getting a deal done. The banks may have extended the repayment date on the club’s loans, but they have made it crystal clear that they want their money back.

Displaying the customary self-assurance of Liverpool’s senior executives, Broughton confidently talked about “completing a sale within a relatively short period – a matter of months.” However, the fans have learned not to believe every statement uttered by the management hierarchy, most notably being disappointed by Rafa Benitez’s failure to deliver the fourth place in the Premier League that he had foolishly guaranteed. Specifically on the investment issue, managing director Christian Purslow’s promises to obtain £100m additional financing first by the turn of the year, then Easter, also proved to be of the empty variety.

Consequently, if we want to know whether Liverpool would be a good investment, we need to stop listening to those who have a vested interest in making the sale. Instead, let’s take a look at the accounts for a truly unbiased view of the club’s financial situation. Fortunately for us, last week the club published a new set of accounts for its parent company, Kop Football (Holdings) Limited. Ideally, these would be more up-to-date, as these results only cover the twelve months up to 31 July 2009. In fact, that’s the first thing to note about these results: they’re issued late (almost a fully year after the accounting period finished), which is rarely a good sign. In fact, it’s normally an indicator of bad news.

Sure enough, the headline figure is a thumping great loss before tax of £54.9m, which is 34% worse than last year’s significant loss of £40.9m. That’s a cumulative loss of £95.8m for the last two years’ results, which would give any prospective buyer pause for thought, especially as this year’s deterioration came after a successful season in which Liverpool’s revenue was enhanced by finishing second in the Premier League and reaching the quarter-finals of the Champions League, and was also boosted by a lucrative pre-season tour of the Far East. It does not take a genius to realise that the 2010 turnover will be adversely impacted by this season’s poor results (seventh in the Premier League, not making it out of their group in the Champions League), while the 2011 revenue will be even lower, as Liverpool have not even qualified for next season’s Champions League.

You don’t have to look too far for the main reason for the record loss: almost all of it is down to the huge interest payments on the loans that the Americans took out to buy the club, which has gone up 10% from £36.5m to £40.1m. Before the current ownership regime arrived, Liverpool never paid more than £3m interest in a year, as they had no need of substantial bank loans, but they have now had to shell out a total of £85.3m in interest since the takeover in February 2007. That is money that could have been used to strengthen the squad or go towards building a new stadium, instead of effectively going to the owners. It’s even more galling, when you see that this year’s increase in interest payable is due to further finance from Kop Football (Cayman) Limited, which happens to be owned by Hicks and Gillett. Financial analysts look at the interest coverage ratio, which shows how many times interest payable is covered by trading profit. Anything below 1.5x is regarded with suspicion, but Liverpool’s trading profit of £27.4m does not cover the £40.1m interest at all.

"Glad you find it funny"

Everyone knows that the club was saddled with a mountain of debt to fund the takeover, but the really bad news is that it is increasing. Net debt shot up £51.6m in the last twelve months from £299.8m to £351.8m. That is net of £26.9m of cash, so the gross debt is even higher at £378.6m, comprising £234m of bank loans (mainly with the Royal Bank of Scotland) and £144m owed to Cayman Limited. Interest on the bank loans is at LIBOR plus 5%, while the inter-company interest is accrued at a less reasonable 10% a year. This has not yet been paid, potentially casting the owners in a good light, until you realise that it is simply added to the growing debt. Earlier this year, managing director Christian Purslow said that the debt was down to £237m, but after looking at these accounts my guess is that he was referring only to the bank loans and not including the money owed to Hicks and Gillett via their offshore company. Some newspapers reported that the total debts were £472.5m, but this is over-stated, as it includes trade creditors, accruals and deferred income.

The Cayman Limited loan is repayable on demand, though the agreement states that this cannot be progressed if it would cause the company to become insolvent, which is “kind” of the owners. Of more concern is that less than half of the £297m credit facility with RBS (£110m) is secured by letters of credit and personal guarantees from the owners, leaving the remaining £187m to be secured by the club’s assets. Supporters might argue that Liverpool’s gross debt of £378.6m is only about half of Manchester United’s debt, but United generate nearly £100m more revenue and their debt is long-term, while Liverpool’s bank loans are extremely short-term in nature. The other English club with significant debt was Arsenal, but that was used to finance the construction of a cash generating new stadium, rapidly eating into the amount owed. Chelsea, of course, are in a different ball game, as their owner has simply converted the debt into equity.

"I'll get £100m by Christmas, no Easter, errm ..."

As the auditors so clearly expressed it, the club is “dependent upon short-term facility extensions”, or relying on the bank’s goodwill, which is a very uncomfortable position to be in. The current credit facility was due for repayment on 24 January 2010, but the club failed to make the £250m payment, so the bank extended the date (by just six weeks) to 3 March. Christian Purslow had previously implied that the repayment to RBS was only due in July, but it looks like the bank was not even willing to wait that long. However, it is believed that they have granted yet another extension, this time for six months, which would mean repayment in September. No wonder Broughton wants to complete the sale in just a few months.

Hicks and Gillett extending the credit facility is a habit that started last year, when RBS forced the owners to pay off £60m of their debt to the bank in return for a one year extension. In hindsight, the criticism of Dr. Rogan Taylor, director of the Football Industry Group at Liverpool University, was right on the money: “It is little more than an expensive fix – just sticking plaster, making things more difficult for the club to progress in the long run. It is still very short term, year to year, if that.” Although the directors claim that “active negotiations are in progress to secure new financing”, they acknowledge their difficulties in the annual report, “The current economic conditions have continued to have a significant impact upon world credit markets and accordingly raising finance in this environment remains challenging.” You can say that again.

Despite these financial constraints, the wage bill has still increased by 14% (£12.4m) from £90.4m to £102.9m, thus joining Chelsea, Manchester United and Arsenal as the only clubs in the Premier League with a payroll over £100m. All the same, the wages to turnover ratio is unchanged at 56%, thanks to the rise in turnover. This is not great, but is still pretty good, though it would look much worse if the club lost the revenue from the Champions League. Oh.

"What the hell's going on?"

Even though the wage bill has grown, the value of the players has actually fallen, at least on the balance sheet, with intangible assets decreasing by £34.7m to £194.8m. Of course, the players’ value in the transfer market would certainly be higher than their net book value, but the financial reality is that the club do not have many assets. In fact, according to the balance sheet, they have less than zero, as net liabilities have increased by more than £50m to £128.5m. This is despite fixed assets increasing by £20.8m, largely as a result of investment in the planning and design of the new stadium.

That means that the club has now managed to spend £45.5m on the proposed new stadium, which is some achievement, given that it is as far away as ever from being started, let alone finished. There’s still no sign of George Gillett’s famous shovel being in the ground. If the auditors decide that this stadium is unlikely to be built, these expenses will no longer be considered an asset, but will have to be written-off. The only other “asset” the club has are accumulated tax losses of £63m, which are available to offset against future profits.

Given these figures, it should be no great surprise that KPMG, the club’s auditors, repeated their warning of a year ago of a “material uncertainty which may cast significant doubt on their ability to continue as a going concern.” The fact that last year’s accounts contained the same admonition without the club going out of existence in the intervening twelve months would suggest that this is not necessarily a doomsday scenario, but it’s still a serious issue. A similar warning was included in Hull City’s last accounts, whereupon chairman Adam Pearson proclaimed, “the supporters should rest assured the club is in no danger of going out of business or going into administration”, but his tune changed a few months later, when he admitted, “nothing could be ruled out.” Hull’s problems were magnified by the significant fall in revenue following relegation from the Premier League. Potential investors in Liverpool might just ask themselves whether non-qualification for the Champions League would have a similar detrimental impact.

The really important issue for Liverpool is whether they have enough cash to pay their bills, not just in terms of their ability to service their debts, but also to pay their players’ wages and (most importantly) their tax bills. As we have seen on numerous occasions this season, HMRC have no hesitation taking football clubs to court to recover any monies owed. Liverpool are not quite there yet, but the cash flow statement does emphasise the basic flaws in their business model. At an operating level, the club generates healthy amounts of cash (£38m in 2009), but it then needs to use all of that and more on paying interest (£29m) and capital expenditure (£51m). This leaves it with a net cash outflow of £42m, which would be even worse if the club had paid the £8m interest owed to Cayman Limited. This shortfall needs to be shored up by additional financing of £49m, which obviously leads to the debt growing even more. It’s a vicious circle.

Anybody thinking of making an investment in a company would also consider the quality of the management, though they should be mindful of one of Warren Buffett’s sagacious quotes, “When a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact.” Nevertheless, it’s worth taking a look at how Liverpool’s management are doing.

One of the key elements in the club’s stated strategy is to strengthen the football squad. Even though manager Rafa Benitez has frequently complained about not being given sufficient resources to compete, his much-loved facts do not appear to support this view. Since his arrival in the summer of 2004, the club has backed him to the tune of spending £249m on bringing players to the club. To be fair, Benitez has recovered £141m from player sales, but that still leaves a net spend of £109m, second only to the big spenders at Manchester City (£228m) and Chelsea (£145m). However, it is considerably more than Manchester United (£32m) and Arsenal, who actually have a transfer surplus of £26m over the same period. Given that all this transfer activity has only resulted in a mediocre seventh place in the Premier League, I would argue that this strategic objective has not been achieved.

The significant spend on new players is reflected in very high amortisation of £45.9m. The accounting treatment here is to write-off the costs associated with buying players over the length of their contracts, based on the (conservative) assumption that a player has no value after his contract expires, since he can then leave on a “free”. To place this into context, this is higher than amortisation costs at Arsenal £23.9m and Manchester United £37.6m, while it is only a little lower than Chelsea £49m.

"Give me more money - or I'm off"

The other component of players’ costs are wages, which is normally a very strong indicator of how well a team is likely to perform on the pitch. For example, this season the first three places in the Premier League were filled by the teams that respectively had the highest wage bill (Chelsea), second highest (Manchester United) and third highest (Arsenal). The only team to buck that trend was Liverpool, who finished seventh, despite having the fourth highest wage bill. To sum up, Benitez has been given an awful lot of money to spend on both transfers and wages, but the statistics indicate that he has under-performed.

But Liverpool are in a Catch-22 situation with Benitez, as the feeling is that the club would prefer him to leave, but that would endanger any stability the club might have. At a time when the manager should be planning for the forthcoming season, there is substantial uncertainty over his position. Some argue that this is due to the size of any potential severance payment, but the latest accounts show that the club is willing to do that if push comes to shove, paying out £4.3m to the former chief executive and academy coaching staff. This reputedly included £3m to Rick Parry, even though he was labeled a “disaster” by Hicks.

And yet, there is some good news in the accounts if you look beyond the headline figures. Most impressively, the club is profitable at an operating level (excluding player trading, interest, tax and amortisation), making £27.4m, which was actually £2.4m (10%) up on last year. This would have been even higher without the £4.3m exceptional severance payment.

"Can you hear the drums, Fernando?"

Benitez has also delivered a £3.4m profit on player sales (Arbeloa, Leto) following a £14.3m profit in 2008 (Crouch, Sissoko, Carson, Riise, Guthrie). A further £13.4m profit was made on sales after the accounting year-end closed (Alonso, Dossena, Voronin). Of course, this is a bit of a double-edged sword, as such good business will keep the banks happy, but no fan likes to see the team’s best players leave. For example, most would agree that Xabi Alonso has not been adequately replaced.

From a financial perspective, you could argue that the £14m increased loss before tax has been largely caused by the £11m reduction in profits from, player sales. In fact, if Alonso had been sold to Real Madrid just a week earlier, the loss would have been smaller than the previous year.

The other encouraging aspect in the accounts was the 14% (£23m) increase in turnover from £161.8m to £184.8m. There was good growth in all categories with broadcasting income rising £6.4m to £74.6m, reflecting the successful season. The £3.3m increase in match day income was particularly impressive, given that there were three fewer home games in 2008/09, but the star of the show was commercial revenue, which soared 25% (£13.5m) to £67.7m, thanks to four new partnerships. Only a curmudgeon would note that this revenue growth was all but wiped out by the £21m cost growth.

Enough about the past, is there anything Liverpool can do to make themselves more attractive financially? Well, they could try to build on last year’s growth and further increase revenue. The new commercial team have obviously not been sitting on their hands, as they have already secured some future growth, notably the new shirt sponsorship deal with Standard Chartered bank that commenced after these accounts. This is worth up to £20m a year, which would be a £12.5m uplift on the old deal with Carlsberg, though apparently a significant element depends on the team’s performance. Liverpool’s commercial revenue of £67.7m is already worthy of praise, only just behind the marketing machine that is Manchester United (£70m) and a long way ahead of Chelsea (£52.8m) and Arsenal (£48.1m), but the prospectus issued last year to investors targeted growth to £111m in the next five years, which would be mighty impressive.

"The money went that way"

Of course, it is TV revenue that has driven the growth in football clubs’ revenue and this is where the failure to qualify for the Champions League will hurt Liverpool. For the 2010 accounts, the Premier League has just published its revenue distribution, which included £48.0m for Liverpool, against £50.3m the previous year. The merit payment was lower, due to the seventh position, and the team was not shown live so many times.

We can also calculate the Champions League participation and performance fees for 2010, which come to €9.1m, as they will receive €3.8m for Champions League participation, €3.3m for group stage participation (six matches at €550,000) and €2.0m for group performance (two wins at €800k, one draw at €400k). According to the Guardian, Liverpool will also be allocated €17.6m from the TV pool, up from €10.1m the previous year. This means that Liverpool will get €26.7m from the Champions League, which is actually €3.5m more than the year before, despite not progressing as far – thanks to the increase in TV money. At current exchange rates, that is worth £23.2m and we can add another £1.9m to that for the Europa League, bringing in a total of £25.1m from Europe, compared to £20.2m last year.

Liverpool’s total TV money in 20009 was £74.6m, so if we subtract the £50.3m from the Premier League and the £20.2m from the Champions League, we can estimate £4.1m came from the FA Cup and Carling Cup. Assuming a similar amount for 2010, we can add the £48.0m from the Premier League and the £25.1m from the Champions League to give a total of £77.2m TV revenue. In other words, 3.5% higher than last year, even though the team’s performance was much worse.

Not bad, but the real problem comes in 2011 when the failure to qualify for the Champions League will begin to bite. That’s at least £25m revenue gone immediately. There might be some compensation from the Europe League, but even if you win that competition, you only get €6m, so that does not really help. As Professor Tom Cannon of Liverpool University said, “qualification for the Champions League remains the crucial factor in enabling the club to maintain income at current levels.” On the other hand, the additional £7.5m that all Premier League teams will receive for the new overseas rights deal will soften the blow to some extent.

However, the real key to unlocking Liverpool’s revenue possibilities is a new stadium. Anfield is a wonderfully atmospheric old ground, but its capacity is only 45,000, which is much less than Old Trafford (76,000) and The Emirates (60,000). According to Deloittes, Liverpool’s match day revenue of £42.5m is less than half of Manchester United (£108.8m) and Arsenal (£100.1m), while even Chelsea, whose Stamford Bridge ground is even smaller (42,000), earn more from this category (£74.5m). Liverpool only earn around £1.6m from each home match, which is significantly less than United (£3.6m) and Arsenal (£3.1m). Yes, it would cost a lot to construct a new stadium (though this could be offset by offering naming rights), but Arsenal have demonstrated that this can be a profitable move, especially if you can sell a few thousand corporate boxes. New chairman Martin Broughton agreed, “I think taking the stadium plan forward has to be in everyone’s interests. I think when you look at the financial logic, it has to happen. It’s inescapable that any new owner would not go ahead with the new project.”

The other way to improve your financials is to cut costs, which in the case of a football club effectively means reducing the wage bill, as it’s by far the largest expense. The easiest, though most unpopular, route would be to cash in on the top stars, like Steven Gerrard and Fernando Torres, which would have the added benefit of generating big money in transfer fees. The Daily Mail reported that Chelsea were preparing a £70m bid for Torres alone. The chairman has assured the fans that the club does not need to sell, “We won’t sacrifice our prize assets to reduce debts”, but the players may take the decision out of his hands, as they want Champions league football and must be unhappy with the club’s financial situation. That would be another vicious circle, as losing these players would then make it even more difficult to qualify for the Champions League.

"Enough about the debt"

This is why the only realistic way out of the financial mess is to sell the club. Over the past year the press has mentioned many possible buyers, including Saudi princes, Kuwaiti billionaires, Indian industrialists, anonymous Americans, Chinese gaming tycoons and our old friends DIC, but Christian Purslow’s deadlines for attracting investment have come and gone without success. To be fair, he was dealt a poor hand, having to convince investors to stump up for a minority stake. He was also hamstrung by Hicks and Gillett, who have consistently over-valued the club, e.g. recent reports mentioned an absurd valuation of £800m. However, one positive side-effect of not qualifying for the Champions League should be a reduction in the price. Furthermore, the Financial Times reported that Broughton has been given “a casting vote on all board issues, including the planned sale.”

Liverpool will have to be careful not to jump from the frying pan into the fire by finding a new owner that would also burden the club with debt. Broughton is aware of this, “It has to be the right owners and also the right financial structure – no more than a reasonable amount of debt that you would expect in any organisation of this size.” It is clear that a new owner would require very deep pockets, but how much would he need? That obviously depends on how much Hicks and Gillett want. The Americans borrowed £300m initially in 2007 (£185m to buy the shares including fees plus £113m working capital), but as we have seen the net debt has risen to about £350m, so a price of £400m would provide them with a tidy £50m profit, which is not too shabby.

"Martin Broughton - he'll take more care of you"

In addition, finance expert David Bick said that a new owner would “need to have access to very large sums of money to build the new stadium, revitalise the management and allow for strengthening of the playing squad.” A new stadium would cost at least £300m (maybe more); the transfer budget required to improve the current under-performing team could be as much as £100m (Torres said that Liverpool were “four or five class players” short of a successful side); while changing the management might cost £15m. If any of this is funded by loans, the owner would also require sufficient working capital to service the debt. When you add all this up, we are not far short of a billion, so millionaires need not apply.

Surely Liverpool are too big to fail? That’s what they said about Lehman Brothers before it went bust. There’s no doubt that the accounts make for awful reading, which was confirmed when the Premier League asked Broughton to provide assurances that the club would be able to fulfill its fixtures next season. RBS also offered assurances that they would continue to support the club until a sale is finalised, but this was only after: (a) Hicks and Gillett reduced the bank loan by paying in more of their own money; (b) Barclays Capital were hired to find a buyer. Now that the bank loans have been trimmed, the bank is unlikely to let the club go broke, especially as it is up for sale. It is also unlikely that a bank would take the unpopular step of cutting off Liverpool’s support, though it is not so long ago that Barclays made a stand over Southampton’s overdraft, ultimately pushing them into administration.

"Kop that"

However, at the risk of stating the obvious, Liverpool are not Southampton. We are talking about one of football’s great institutions with an incredible history: winning the Champions League and European Cup five times, the English League championship eighteen times and the FA Cup seven times. In marketing terms, it is still one of the leading global football brands, playing in the richest domestic club competition in the world. It surely cannot be time to say “good-bye”, but are Liverpool a good buy? Many people would not want to invest their hard-earned money, but if a wealthy benefactor had a spare billion, he just might.